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INTEROPERABILITY OF UNITED STATES 
AND CANADIAN ARMED FORCES 
GARY WALSH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the soldiers of the First Special Service Force (FSSF) 
scaled the sheer cliffs of Mount de la Difensa in Italy during the eve-
ning of December 2, 1943, they surprised the German defenders and 
seized key terrain that had resisted such capture for months.1  The 
complexity of this operation would have challenged the elite infantry 
forces of either Canada or the United States.  Nevertheless, this unit, 
composed of soldiers wearing the uniforms of both nations and led by 
both Canadian and United States officers and noncommissioned offi-
cers, accomplished this and other equally difficult missions during the 
latter part of WWII.2 
Since WWII, Canada and the United States (U.S.) have built on 
this legacy, forging a remarkable military partnership, performing 
combined3 or multinational4 military operations.  Perhaps the most 
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 1. Scott R. McMichael, Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Combat Studies Inst. Res. 
Surv. No. 6, U.S. Army Command & Staff College 177-81 (1987), available at http://www-cgsc. 
army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/historic/hist_c4_pt1.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  See also 
Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds, Notes on Military Elite Units, Combat Studies Inst. Rep. 
No. 4, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College 4 (1984), available at http://www-cgsc. 
army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/bounds2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (offering further 
discussion of the First Special Service Force). 
 2. McMichael, supra note 2, at 186-92, available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/ 
download/csipubs/historic/hist_c4_pt2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 3. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEP’T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY 
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 100 (2004), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/jel/doddict/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY], defines a 
combined operation as one “conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together 
for the accomplishment of a single mission.” 
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visible and well-known partnership is embodied in the NORAD 
Agreement5, which created the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) located in Colorado Springs, Colorado.  This 
Cold War-era partnership retains its relevance and vitality during the 
evolving transnational or terrorist threat to the two nations.  In an 
Exchange of Notes in December 2002, the U.S. and Canada “affirmed 
the merits of broadening bi-national defence arrangements in order 
to: 
1. prevent or mitigate threats or attacks by terrorists or others 
on Canada or the United States; and 
2. ensure a cooperative and well-coordinated response to na-
tional requests for military assistance in relation to terrorist, 
or other, threats or attacks, natural disasters, or other major 
emergencies in Canada or the United States.”6 
Another, more recent, example of military cooperation is Opera-
tion APOLLO, in which U.S. and Canadian infantry units conducted 
combat operations in Afghanistan against Taliban and Al Qaeda 
forces.7 
Unity of effort in a combined or multinational operation is a 
fundamental principle of operation.8  The objectives of the operation 
must be clearly defined by the leader of the operation and supported 
by each member nation.  The planning and conduct of such combined 
operations must take into account the national and international legal 
obligations of the respective nations.  Differing obligations may result 
 
 4. DOD DICTIONARY defines a multinational operation as a “collective term to describe 
military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the 
structure of a coalition or alliance.”  Id. at 351. 
 5. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Mar. 11, 1981, U.S.-Can., 
33 U.S.T. 1277 [hereinafter NORAD Agreement].  This Agreement was extended until May 12, 
2006 by an Exchange of Notes signed at Washington June 16, 2000.  Negotiations will begin in 
2005 for the renewal of the Agreement. 
 6. Agreement regarding Canada-United States Cooperation in Broadening Bi-National 
Defence Arrangements for North American Security, Exchange of Notes, Dec. 9 2002, U.S.-
Can.  The text of this agreement is available at http://www.canadianembassy.org/defence/text-
en.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 7. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien provided Canadian Forces to support the 
United States operation in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) in response to 
the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson.  The Canadian Forces’ Contribution to the International Campaign Against 
Terrorism, CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/ 
view_news_e.asp?id=388 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). [hereinafter Canadian Forces’ 
Contribution]. 
 8. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3.0,DOCTRINE FOR JOINT 
OPERATIONS  VI-3 (2001). 
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in an inability to operate smoothly as a combined force, pursuing a 
common goal.  These challenges to the “interoperability”9 of Cana-
dian and U.S. Forces are not insurmountable. 
Military attorneys are essential to the process of achieving this 
interoperability.  They assist in identifying the potential points of fric-
tion, such as critical differences in rules for use of force or employ-
ment of certain weapons, so that the differences can be resolved dur-
ing the planning of the operation.  This article will address the role 
that attorneys and the law play in promoting unity of effort in com-
bined U.S. and Canadian operations.  It will (1) provide an overview 
of the process by which attorneys in each nation’s armed forces pro-
vide legal advice on operations, (2) identify the key differences in in-
ternational legal obligations of each nation, and (3) discuss how na-
tional differences can be resolved, as illustrated by the issues of land 
mines and use of deadly force. 
II.  LEGAL REVIEW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
A. U.S. Approach 
The Department of Defense has established a comprehensive 
program to ensure the law of war10 is understood and complied with 
by all members of the armed forces.  One of the central requirements 
of this program is that qualified legal advisers review all plans, poli-
cies, and rules of engagement to ensure their consistency with the law 
of war obligations of the United States.11  The discipline of “opera-
tional law”12 provides the framework for legal advisers to fulfill this 
responsibility. 
 
 9. DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 270, defines interoperability as the “ability of sys-
tems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or 
forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.” 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 4.1 (Dec. 
9,1998) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR PROGRAM]. The law of war is described as “[t]hat part of 
international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.  It is often called the law of 
armed conflict.  The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities 
binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international 
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.”  
Id. at 3.1. 
 11. Id. at 4.1. Paragraphs 5.3.3, 5.7.3, and 5.8.6 extend this requirement to the components 
of Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commanders of 
Combatant Commands. 
 12. Operational Law is defined as the “body of domestic, foreign, and international law 
that impacts specifically upon the activities of U.S. Forces in war and operations other than 
war. . . . It includes military justice, administrative and civil law, legal assistance, claims, pro-
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1. Emergence of Operational Law.  Attorneys in the U.S. mili-
tary trace their lineage to 1775, when George Washington appointed 
Colonel William Tudor as the first Judge Advocate of the Continental 
Army.13  Since the beginning, these attorneys, more commonly re-
ferred to as Judge Advocates, have provided advice to commanders 
in every major conflict, including the Civil War, World Wars I and II, 
and the Korean War.  The practice during the pre-Vietnam era con-
sisted of the traditional legal disciplines of military criminal law, con-
tracts, claims, and administrative law.  Judge Advocates also played a 
key role in prosecuting war crimes cases in Germany and Japan. 
The Vietnam War marked the beginning of the expansion of the 
practice of Judge Advocates in combat.  Colonel Frederic L. Borch 
III notes in his excellent historical account of Army Lawyers in Mili-
tary Operations that individual Judge Advocates began to push the 
boundaries of traditional practice out by engaging in such issues as 
“. . .the investigation and documentation of war crimes, the classifica-
tion of detainees and treatment of prisoners of war, Law of War in-
struction, and the provision of advice to host nation authorities on a 
wide range of subjects.”14  Nevertheless, in the years following Viet-
nam, Judge Advocates in the Army and other services concentrated 
primarily on the familiar areas of military criminal law and adminis-
trative law.  They taught the Law of War to officers and enlisted, as 
required by the Department of Defense Law of War Program,15 but 
rarely became involved in the planning and conduct of military opera-
tions.  The U.S. intervention on the island of Grenada in October 
1983 served to refocus attention on the complex legal dimension of 
modern combat. 
The U.S. mission in Grenada, called Operation URGENT 
FURY, was relatively straightforward – rescue American citizens en-
dangered by the spiraling violence and assist the Caribbean Peace-
keeping Force in restoring order.16  Yet, the brief engagement pro-
duced a host of legal issues which had not been anticipated by the 
 
curement law, national security law, fiscal law, and international law.” INT’L AND 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK  A-1 (1994) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
 13. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, available at 
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETINTERNET/HOMEPAGES/AC/TJAGSAWEB.NSF/
Main?OpenFrameset (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 14. FREDERIC L. BORCH III, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT 51 (2001). 
 15. LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 5.5.1. 
 16. See BORCH, supra note 14, at 61–62. 
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Judge Advocates accompanying the U.S. Forces.  Among the more 
pressing concerns were: 
• Developing rules of engagement for the combat and peace-
keeping phases of the operation17 
• determining the status of detainees, including a number of 
Cuban nationals 
• safeguarding and transporting to safety several diplomatic 
personnel from the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and 
Cuba 
• investigating alleged violations of the law of war18 
These issues were resolved, although not without some missteps 
and false starts.  Following an after-action review of the legal issues in 
URGENT FURY, the Judge Advocate General’s School of the 
Army, in 1986, recommended that the new discipline of operational 
law be developed.19  Since that time, the Army and the other services 
have designed concepts of organization, operation, and training to en-
sure that military attorneys are well equipped and available to advise 
commanders on the legal dimensions of military operations.  The ap-
proach that the Army has taken is representative of the other ser-
vices. 
2. Organization.  Judge Advocates go where the work is.  They 
are positioned with commands in such a manner that they can operate 
as an integral member of the staff.  The senior Judge Advocate (or 
Staff Judge Advocate) responsible for providing legal support to a 
unit conducting operations will tailor the support for each specific op-
eration by detailing judge advocates to the appropriate command or 
staff elements.  The detailed Judge Advocates will deploy with the 
unit and will be normally be under the technical supervision of the 
Staff Judge Advocate, receiving guidance, direction and assistance.20  
In fact, Judge Advocates have been so close to the action that they 
 
 17. Judge Advocates were not involved in the development of rules of engagement for the 
combat phase of URGENT FURY, but helped draft the rules for the peacekeeping phase. Id. at 
72–73. 
 18. Id. at 71–72. 
 19. David E. Graham, Operational Law-A Concept Comes of Age, ARMY LAW. 9, 10 (July 
1987). 
 20. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS, para. 
2.4.2 (2000) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 27-100]. 
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have occasionally been drawn into the conflict, with at least one 
Judge Advocate being decorated for heroism in Iraq.21 
3. Operating Concept.  The Army’s concept for providing legal 
support to military operations is detailed in Field Manual Number 27-
100.  The mission statement succinctly describes how Judge Advo-
cates will provide timely and relevant legal advice to commanders in 
challenging, and sometimes ambiguous, circumstances: 
“Pursuing the mission in the 21st Century will challenge judge ad-
vocates in three distinct ways.  First, judge advocates must become 
increasingly refined as soldiers and lawyers.  Judge advocates must 
understand how the Army will accomplish its various missions, and 
how to identify and resolve legal issues arising during these mis-
sions. . . .  They must be thoroughly grounded in all core legal disci-
plines to be effective in a fluid operational environment.  They 
must be increasingly knowledgeable in international law as the 
Army cooperates with other nations’ forces to secure United States 
interests world-wide. 
Second, judge advocates must become more involved in the mili-
tary decision-making process in critical planning cells, and at lower 
levels of command.  As information technology increases the speed of 
decision-making and allows fusion of information in distinct cells, it 
becomes critical for judge advocates to be located where the relevant 
picture of the battlefield is received, evaluated, resolved, and af-
fected.  Otherwise, legal advice will not be timely or effective.  To be 
proactive, the judge advocate must be present.  As information tech-
nology empowers decision-makers at lower levels of command, judge 
advocates must be present there. 
Third, judge advocates must be capable of expanding the level of 
legal support to meet the mission demands of a force projection 
army. . . .  Judge advocates, in both the active and reserve compo-
nents, must plan for the legal resources to meet these demands, and 
must be prepared to provide services with the deploying unit, the 
power projection platform, or home station.”22 
 
 21. THE REGIMENTAL REP. (JAG Legal Center and Sch. Alumni Ass’n), Fall 2003, at 1, 
available at http://www.tjagsaalumni.org/rrpdf/2003fall.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  Four 
members of a legal team were on patrol in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, when another nearby 
patrol was ambushed and several of its soldiers wounded.  The team immediately went to the 
assistance of the other soldiers, returned fire, and helped evacuate the wounded.  Captain Keith 
Bracey, Warrant Officer One Donnell McIntosh, Master Sergeant Brian Quarm, and Specialist 
Benjamin Prutz were each subsequently awarded the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device for 
heroism.  Captain Bracey was also awarded the Purple Heart for a wound he suffered during the 
action. 
 22. FIELD MANUAL 27-100, supra note 20. 
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4. Training.  The evolving discipline of operational law is a key 
element in the curriculum of The Judge Advocate General’s School 
of the Army (the JAG School).  Both the Basic Course, designed to 
educate attorneys just entering the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 
and the Graduate Course, an LL.M. program for career attorneys, in-
clude extensive study of international and operational law issues. 23  
The materials and seminars reflect the lessons learned from the past 
twenty years of military operations.  The JAG School also conducts 
one-week courses for those attorneys entering positions that require 
knowledge of operational law. 
B. Canadian Approach 
The legal branch of the Canadian Forces traces its distinguished 
history back to 1911, with Judge Advocates serving in theaters of op-
eration during World Wars I and II, as well as in the Korean Con-
flict.24  The Canadian Judge Advocates, much as their U.S. counter-
parts, practiced traditional law during these conflicts, primarily 
engaging in military criminal law, personal legal assistance to soldiers, 
and claims against the government.25 
1. Emergence of Operational Law.  The Canadian Forces Legal 
Branch expanded its focus to include operational law in the 1990’s.26  
Just as the U.S. military had in Grenada, the Canadian Forces experi-
enced a watershed event that reinforced the need for increased em-
phasis on Judge Advocate participation in military operations.  The 
Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to support the United Na-
tions Operations in Somalia (UNSOSOM) in 1993.  While the overall 
performance of the unit was excellent, the torture and death of a So-
mali detainee at the hands of a small number of paratroopers over-
 
 23. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, supra note 14 (of-
fering a history of the JAG School and a description of the Basic and Graduate Courses avail-
able). 
 24. ARTHUR R. MCDONALD, CANADA’S MILITARY LAWYERS 16, 21–23, 45–60, & 77–83 
(2002). 
 25. Id. at 45–70, 79. 
 26. Kenneth W. Watkin, The Operational Lawyer: An Essential Resource for the Modern 
Commander 13, available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/operational_law/TheOperationalLawyer_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005).  The working definition of operational law for the Directorate of Law/Operations is 
“[t]hat body of law, both domestic and international, impacting specifically upon legal issues 
associated with the planning for and deployment of Canadian Forces in both peacetime and 
combat environments.”  Id. at 1. 
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shadowed the entire mission.27  The resulting Board of Inquiry rec-
ommended, among other actions, that legal officers deploy with units 
on training and actual missions to advise commanders and soldiers on 
all legal aspects of the operations.28 
Throughout the 1990’s, Canadian Judge Advocates deployed 
with and provided crucial legal support to Canadian Forces during the 
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), and peace keeping or peace enforce-
ment operations in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Italy, East Timor, 
Rwanda and Ethiopia.29  The advice provided by these attorneys 
ranged from the legitimacy of objectives in the bombing campaign in 
Bosnia30 to the crafting of rules of engagement for Canadian units in 
Rwanda.31  When Canadian naval, air, land and special forces de-
ployed to Afghanistan in Operation APOLLO32 following the terror-
ist attacks on September 11, several Judge Advocates accompanied 
the forces.33 
2. Organization.  The demonstrated need for legal advisers in 
these increasingly complex military operations drove a restructuring 
of the Legal Branch of the Canadian Forces.  Commanders began re-
questing lawyers to accompany them on operations, and the Legal 
Branch accommodated them by assigning Judge Advocates to nine-
teen field offices, all under the supervision of the Deputy Judge Ad-
vocate General for Operations.34  This Deputy also assigns Judge Ad-
vocates to support the units that deploy on missions.  This differs 
somewhat from the U.S. approach, in that the deployed Canadian 
Judge Advocates are directly responsible to the Judge Advocate 
General, rather than to the commander of the unit to which they are 
detailed.  The rationale for the Canadian approach is that it “en-
hances the provision of independent legal advice.”35  This is in slight 
contrast to the U.S. practice, which allows the Judge Advocate to be 
under the command of the commander of the supported unit. 
 
 27. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 154–63. 
 28. Watkin, supra note 25, at 13. 
 29. Id. at 5–6. 
 30. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 172. 
 31. Id. at 175. 
 32. Canadian Forces’ Contribution, supra note 8. 
 33. Watkin, supra note 25, at 6. 
 34. Id. at 182–84. 
 35. Jerry S.T. Pitzul, Operational Law and the Legal Professional: A Canadian Perspective, 
51 A.F. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001). 
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3. Operating Concept.  The Canadian Judge Advocates sup-
porting deployed units perform essentially the same tasks as their 
U.S. counterparts.  The Judge Advocate General of the Canadian 
Forces, Brigadier General Jerry S.T. Pitzul, in an address at the U.S. 
Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School, provided just a sample 
of the legal issues in which Judge Advocates are engaged: 
• Legal basis or mandate for the operation 
• Use of force guidelines 
• Targeting 
• Review of Operations Plans 
• Legality of weapons 
• Investigation of alleged war crimes 
• Treatment of civilians and refugees 
• Instruction in Law of Armed Conflict 
• Negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements36 
As mentioned earlier, the ability of the Judge Advocates to pro-
vide this operational legal advice while deployed with Canadian 
Forces is an essential component of the Legal Branch’s mission.  This 
presence with the deployed unit gives a greater understanding of the 
operating environment and challenges facing the commander and 
soldiers.  It also enables the Judge Advocate to provide more timely 
advice during fast-paced operations.37  Superb training of the Judge 
Advocates in the relevant law and operations planning process is also 
a critical requirement. 
4. Training.  Spurred by recent experience and certainty of fu-
ture deployments, the Legal Branch has generated an excellent pro-
gram of instruction in Operational Law.38  This two-week course inte-
grates the academic with the practical and sharply hones the skills of 
Judge Advocates who advise and deploy with Canadian Forces.  The 
curriculum comprises the international legal basis for military inter-
vention, the process for determining the propriety of selecting targets 
for attack, and the development of rules of engagement.  The faculty 
speaks from the experience of several recent assignments to areas of 
conflict, such as Afghanistan and Haiti.  Because most Canadian mili-
tary operations are conducted in coalition with the forces of other na-
 
 36. Id. at 311–21. 
 37. Watkin, supra note 25, at 15. 
 38. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/ 
jag/main_e.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
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tions, including the U.S., a significant portion of the instruction ad-
dresses the intricacies of operating with allies that may be bound by 
differing international legal obligations. 
III.  DIFFERING TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
The law that binds the Canadian and U.S. Forces affects the abil-
ity of the armed forces of each nation to operate with a combined ef-
fect.  This law includes not only the treaties to which they are a party, 
but also the national or domestic law of each nation.  As an example, 
U.S. Forces are restricted in their ability to operate within the U.S. by 
the Posse Comitatus Act.39  Canadian Forces have greater statutory 
authority for providing assistance to law enforcement agencies and 
other Canadian Government agencies.40  For purposes of considering 
combined operations outside the national borders, though, the points 
of departure are primarily in the following areas: 
A. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention 
The Government of Canada is a party to both Additional Proto-
cols I41 and II.42  The U.S. has not has not ratified either Protocol, but 
considers most of the provisions to be applicable as customary inter-
national law.43  The U.S. does object to many of the provisions of Pro-
tocol I that would expand the definitions of international armed con-
flicts and combatants, so Judge Advocates should alert operation 
planners to these areas of disagreement. 
 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). 
 40. See Watkin, supra note 25, at 7 (describing Canada’s use of armed forces to assist gov-
ernmental agencies). 
 41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3, 16 I.L.M. 1391. 
 42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 
16 I.L.M. 1442. 
 43. INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL 
CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003), available at 
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/jagcnetinternet/homepages/ac/tjagsaweb.nsf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2005). 
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B. Anti-Personnel Mine Convention (APM)44 
The Government of Canada not only signed and ratified the 
APM, but also was a major proponent of this development in interna-
tional humanitarian law.  The U.S., on the other hand, has not ratified 
the convention.  It has, however, embraced a policy that advances the 
intent behind the treaty.  This still leaves a situation in which U.S. 
Forces may employ anti-personnel mines during a combined opera-
tion while Canadian Forces would be prohibited from employing the 
same method of warfare. 
IV.  SPECIFIC ISSUES AFFECTING INTEROPERABILITY 
Past and current operations in which Canadian and U.S. Forces 
operate together are characterized by a high degree of compatibility 
in techniques, tactics, and procedures.  Yet, there are a few differ-
ences in law and policy that affect interoperability of the forces.  Two 
such issues are: 
• Use of land mines 
• Use of deadly force to protect property 
A. Use of Land Mines 
Land mines, designed for use against enemy combatants (anti-
personnel mines) and against armored vehicles (anti-tank mines), are 
very effective in defending friendly forces against enemy attack and 
denying the enemy the use of key terrain.  Nevertheless, the indis-
criminate use of land mines by groups who fail to comply with the 
Amended Protocol II (Mines Protocol) of the 1980 Conventional 
Weapons Treaty45 has created a humanitarian problem in countries 
around the world.46  The types of mines used and the manner of em-
ployment are at the heart of the problem. 
Persistent land mines are those that do not self-destruct or self-
deactivate within a relatively short, pre-determined time.  These 
 
 44. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines (APL) and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36 
I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter APM Convention]. 
 45. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other 
Devices (Protocol II) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Mine Protocol]. 
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Landmine Policy White Paper, (Feb. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30047.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Landmine 
Policy White Paper]. 
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mines remain lethal for years, even decades.  Land mines that cannot 
be detected using available technology also present a long-term threat 
to non-combatants.  The Mine Protocol addressed these and other 
aspects of anti-personnel mine use, including a requirement that the 
party laying mines assume the responsibility to prevent their irre-
sponsible or indiscriminate use.47 
The international community built upon the foundation of the 
Mine Protocol in an effort to further reduce the impact of anti-
personnel mines on non-combatants.  The Government of Canada 
championed this effort, resulting in the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines 
Convention;48 Canada and 144 other nations have ratified the treaty.49 
The Canadian Forces, in compliance with the APM Convention, 
cannot: 
• use anti-personnel mines;50 
• develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or 
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel 
mines; or 
• assist, encourage or induce activities prohibited by the APM 
Convention.51 
The U.S. continues to use anti-personnel mines in a manner con-
sistent with the Mine Protocol.  In fact, the current U.S. policy on 
land mines exceeds the requirements for use of anti-personnel mines 
under the Mine Protocol and addresses the use of anti-tank mines, 
which are not covered under the APM Convention.52 
 
 47. Mine Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 3. 
 48. See THE ACRONYM INST. FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Disarmament Documen-
tation, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0212/doc01.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) 
(discussing Canada’s role in the ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention). 
 49. See APM Convention, supra note 44.  For an up-to-date list of the countries who have 
signed the APM Convention, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Anti-Personnel Landmines, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Focus:Landmines?Open 
Document (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
 50. “Anti-personnel Mine” is defined as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons,” 
while “mine” is defined as “a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or 
other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a ve-
hicle.” APM Convention, supra note 44, 2056 U.N.T.S. at 242, art. 2. 
 51. OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. JOINT DOCTRINE 
MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS [B-GJ-
005-104/FP-021] para. A001, at 5A-1 (Aug. 18, 2001), available at http://www.dcds.forces.ca/ 
jointDoc/docs/LOAC_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT]. 
 52. Landmine Policy White Paper, supra note 46.  To reduce humanitarian hazards posed 
by mines, the U.S. will, among other actions: 
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The APM Convention does not prohibit the use of anti-
personnel mines that are command-detonated.  The Canadian Forces 
are authorized to use anti-personnel mines, such as the Claymore 
Mine, if they are detonated by mechanical or electronic means.53  In 
this respect, the Canadian and U.S. Forces are fully interoperable.  
The use by U.S. Forces of any other type of anti-personnel mine 
poses a challenge for Canadian Forces, however.  Imagine, for in-
stance, a combined Canadian and United States military operation in 
which the forces are co-located.  The U.S., under its current policy, 
may employ anti-personnel landmines as part of the defensive pe-
rimeter around the combined force.  These mines may or may not be 
command-detonated.  How does this use of landmines prohibited by 
the APM Convention affect the operations of the Canadian Forces? 
The Government of Canada became a party to the APM Con-
vention with the Statement of Understanding that the mere participa-
tion in combined operations with a non-party State would not be a 
violation of the Convention.54  However, the Canadian Forces may 
not use anti-personnel mines other than those that are command-
detonated and may not request the non-party State, such as the U.S., 
to use anti-personnel mines in the defense of the Canadian Forces.55  
In the example above, if the combined force is under the command 
and control of a U.S. commander, the Canadian Force would recog-
nize the right of the U.S. Force to defend itself through the use of 
anti-personnel mines, although the Canadian Force could not be ac-
tively involved in the planning or emplacement of the mines.56  If the 
 
• After the year 2010 no longer use persistent landmines of any type; 
• Develop alternatives to current persistent landmines that incorporate enhanced self-
destructing/self-deactivating technologies; and 
• Employ only those landmines that exceed the detectability specifications of the Mine 
Protocol. 
 53. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 51, at para. A002, at 5A-2. 
 54. Id. at para. A001, 5A-1 (“It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in 
the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United nations 
or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Ca-
nadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercise, or other military activity con-
ducted in combination with the armed forces of States not a party to the Convention which en-
gage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be 
assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in arti-
cle 1, paragraph 1 (c).”). 
 55. Id. at para. A002, 5A-2. 
 56. See id. (“The right of states which are not signatories or parties to the APM Conven-
tion to use anti-personnel mines in self-defence is not precluded by the Convention.”). 
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combined force is under the command of a Canadian officer, than 
anti-personnel mines could not be used under any circumstances.57 
The Canadian approach to use of anti-personnel mines reconciles 
that nation’s legal obligation under the APM Convention with the 
practical concerns of operating with the U.S. and other states not par-
ties to the Convention.  The combined forces commander and plan-
ning staff must recognize the legal and policy limitations on Canada’s 
use of landmines and construct the operations plan in a way that will 
provide for protection of the combined force without jeopardizing 
Canada’s status under the APM. 
B. Use of Deadly Force to Protect Property 
Both Canada and U.S. Forces regulate the use of force in opera-
tions through rules of engagement (ROE).58  Each nation bases these 
rules on national and international law, national policy, and opera-
tional requirements.  Each nation also distinguishes between rules for 
armed conflict and rules for peacetime operations short of armed con-
flict.59 
The law and policy upon which Canadian and U.S. ROE are 
based are generally very similar.  As a result, there are usually few 
differences that must be resolved in developing ROE for combined 
U.S.-Canadian operations.  Limitations on use of weapons, such as 
those on anti-personnel mines previously discussed, present one area 
of difference.  Another area is the use of force to protect property in 
operations short of armed conflict. 
The Canadian approach to ROE in peacetime operations and 
those short of armed conflict recognizes that Canadian Forces have 
 
 57. Id. (“The use of anti-personnel mines by the combined force will not be authorized in 
cases where Canada is in command of a combined force.”). 
 58. The Department of Defense defines ROE  for U.S. Forces as the “[d]irectives issued by 
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which the 
United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encoun-
tered.”  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 461.  The Canadian definition is similar: “ROE are 
orders issued by military authority that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, manner, 
and limitations within which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be 
applied to achieve military objectives in accordance with national policy and the law.”  
CANADIAN NAT’L DEF., USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, at 5-5 (Nov. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/docs/B-GJ-005-300_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS]. 
 59. Id. at 5-6.  For the unclassified policy on U.S. ROE, see CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S 
FORCES, (Jan. 15, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/cjcs_sroe.pdf 
(last visisted Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter SROE]. 
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no authority to use force (except for self-defense) unless authorized 
through ROE.60  The defense of Canadian military or non-military 
property is not included in the right of self-defense, so ROE must 
specifically authorize the use of force for that purpose.61  This is simi-
lar to the U.S. approach to the defense of property.  The authority to 
use force in the defense against the attempted theft, damage or de-
struction of specific property is addressed in ROE.  For example, the 
U.S. Forces operating in the peace enforcement operation in Kosovo 
in 1999 received the following authority to defend property: 
“You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take pos-
session of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property with 
designated special status, and there is no way of avoiding this.”62 
The authority for Canadian Forces to use deadly force to protect 
property may not be as extensive as the authority exercised by U.S. 
Forces.  The Chief of Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces has stated 
that such authority “will not be all-inclusive and will generally be re-
stricted to property with designated special status. . .”63  The U.S. 
Forces are frequently authorized to use deadly force to protect a 
broad category of military property (arms, ammunition, shoulder-
fired rockets, etc.) as distinct from other property that has been des-
ignated with a special status. 
Both nations address this potential difference in authority in 
their doctrine and ROE.  The Canadian publication on ROE ac-
knowledges that “diplomatic considerations may ultimately limit le-
gitimate uses of force, or they may permit a greater latitiude in the 
use of force than would be permitted in a purely Canadian opera-
tion. . . .”64  Both Canada and the U.S. take the position that their re-
spective forces may operate under combined or multi-national ROE 
only after the rules are approved by the Chief of Defence Staff for the 
Canadian Forces65 or by the President or Secretary of Defense for 
U.S. Forces.66 Clearly, the optimal solution is to craft a single set of 
ROE for the combined force, taking into consideration the legal obli-
gations and restraints of each nation’s armed force. 
 
 60. USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at 5-6. 
 61. Id. 
 62. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,. supra note 43, at 99. 
 63. USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at 5-3. 
 64. Id. at 5-7. 
 65. Id. at 5-7. 
 66. SROE, supra note 59, at para. 1c(1), at Enclosure A. 
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If there is a difference in authority, such as using force in the de-
fense of property, that cannot be resolved, each nation has a “de-
fault” position.  The U.S. Forces will operate under the Standing 
Rules of Engagement67 after first notifying the other participating 
forces of this action.  The Canadian Chief of Defense Staff may 
choose one of the following alternatives: 
• caveat the combined or multi-national ROE for Canadian 
Forces personnel, that is, clearly identify in the ROE which 
rules will not apply to the CF; 
• issue-specific ROE for Canadian Forces 
• withdraw Canadian contingent from the mission.68 
An incident during the UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti in 
1995 (Operation Pivot) illustrates the occasional conflict in self-
defense authority between Canadian and U.S. Forces and how this 
conflict may be resolved.  As recorded in Canada’s Military Lawyers: 
One of the initial legal problems was the difference between the 
Rules of Engagement applicable to the Canadians and those fol-
lowed by the Americans and other UN contingents.  Canada had 
stricter limitations on the use of deadly force than these others.  In 
one example, an American Captain who was in charge of four or 
five Canadian military engineers saw a theft take place and tried to 
catch the thief.  When he could not, he ordered the Canadians to 
shoot the culprit.  The Canadians declined, citing the limitations in 
their Rules of Engagement that prohibited shooting someone who 
was running away and of no immediate danger to the Canadians or 
those under their protection.69 
In this instance, the differing authority for the use of deadly force 
in self-defense and defense of property was resolved with the issuance 
of ROE specific to the Canadian contingent. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There may be sound policy or political reasons for the leaders of 
our respective nations not to participate in a combined or multi-
national operation.  National interests and international relations dif-
fer.  Nevertheless, the differing legal obligations with respect to use of 
force and weapons should not be an obstacle to a combined military 
effort.  The differences are few and the doctrine and practice of each 
 
 67. Id. at para. 1c(2), at Enclosure A. 
 68. See USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at para. 507, at 5-6 (“The CDS is 
the sole authority for the authorization of ROE or changes to the ROE.”). 
 69. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 176. 
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nation provides sufficient flexibility to achieve unity of effort while 
honoring the obligations of each nation.  Judge Advocates in both 
Canadian and U.S. Forces continue to be instrumental in weaving the 
fabric of that combined effort. 
